Dybbuks and Proto-Sociality: 21st Century Science

What follows is a bit of an experiment. Battling a lifelong case of writer's block I poured all my thoughts into prompts to ChatGPT, including a few new terms, and asked it to turn out readable expository prose. It did, but not entirely to my liking. I tweaked with prompts containing clarifications, expansions and corrections and, after a few iterations, we arrived at the following first draft. Much flesh must be added to these bare bones but I think this will give you a good idea of one of the threads I want to pursue in this blog

1) A Dybbuk Is Haunting Science: Rethinking Knowledge in the Age of Information

For centuries, Western science has been an extraordinary engine of knowledge. Through meticulous observation, mathematical reasoning, and experimentation, it has yielded a robust understanding of the natural world—solid, tangible, reliable. This process was accelerated by a guiding assumption: that scientists could, in a sense, glimpse into “God's sensorium,” observing nature directly and yielding objective, ontologically solid results. The intricate frameworks or interpretive systems used to obtain these results could be conveniently left in the background, dismissed as mere instruments rather than integral to the reality they revealed.

This strategy worked wonders during the early phases of scientific discovery. The study of classical mechanics, electromagnetism, and even early thermodynamics didn’t need to wrestle with foundational questions about the frameworks of interpretation. The phenomena studied were, by and large, macroscopic, relatively simple, and resistant to the strange contradictions that would later emerge. Scientists could afford to isolate information from its context, assume objectivity, and discard the scaffolding of interpretation. Nature yielded her truths, or so it seemed.

But what if this approach, successful as it was, concealed a deeper epistemological error? What if the frameworks we so readily discarded were not incidental, but central to understanding the information we extract from nature?

The Cracks Begin to Show

By the mid-19th century, the cracks in this approach began to emerge. Take Maxwell’s Demon—a thought experiment that introduced questions about the role of information in thermodynamic processes. Suddenly, information itself seemed to influence physical outcomes. The demon’s ability to discern the speed of particles, and thus lower entropy, suggested that measurement and observation were not neutral processes but deeply entangled with the behavior of the system.

From there, the cracks only widened.

The Role of Information Ensembles and Entities

Despite these developments, the traditional practice of science has been to address these cracks on an ad hoc basis, invoking frameworks of interpretation as needed, but without a wholesale reassessment of their role in shaping the nature of scientific knowledge.

This brings us to the concepts of information ensembles and information entities. Historically, science has focused on entities—the tangible outcomes, the “facts” or data points revealed by experimentation and observation. These entities, however, are always extracted via ensembles—frameworks of interpretation that specify how we measure, what we consider relevant, and which parameters we are willing to ignore.

For example:

It is in this broader ensemble of interpretive frameworks—let's call it “Max's Dybbuk”—that information entities acquire meaning and relevance. The distinction between what is real and what is contingent on interpretation breaks down under the strain of the deeper complexities we now face.

Toward a Reformulation of Science

It is time to reconsider how we do science. The great successes of the past came from treating information entities as ontologically independent, stripped of their interpretive baggage. But as we've seen, this method is no longer sufficient. We need a more explicit acknowledgment of the role information ensembles play in shaping our understanding of reality.

This does not imply a rejection of realism in science, but it does suggest a shift toward an epistemic humility—one that recognizes the limits of any given interpretive framework and opens the door to multiple valid approaches to understanding complex systems. It also calls for a re-examination of the canon of scientific knowledge: How much of what we consider objective reality is contingent on unexamined information ensembles that might obscure deeper truths?

By reframing science through the lens of information entities and ensembles, we might finally address the cracks that began to show in the 19th century and continue to challenge us today. It’s time to acknowledge that every scientific result carries with it the ghosts—or Dybbuks—of the frameworks that shaped its discovery.

2) From God's Sensorium to Proto-Sociality: Reframing the Foundations of Scientific Inquiry

In Part 1, we explored how the history of Western science has been shaped by an implicit assumption: that scientists, standing in “God's sensorium,” could observe nature directly, extracting real information entities without needing to account for the interpretive frameworks through which these observations were made. This strategy served science well during its early stages, yielding discoveries rapidly and allowing for cumulative progress. But as science ventured into more complex territory, cracks began to appear in this model.

The time has come for a paradigm shift, one that acknowledges the indispensable role of information ensembles—the interpretive frameworks that shape what counts as information in the first place. Yet there’s a deeper, more profound implication here: information ensembles introduce into science a form of proto-sociality, replacing the metaphysical fantasy of a lone observer in God's sensorium with a more grounded, relational model of knowledge.

The Relational Turn: Science as a Collective Endeavor

The assumption that science is carried out from some metaphysical “outside” perspective—an observer detached from the world they observe—has been central to the traditional conception of scientific objectivity. This has meant treating scientific inquiry as a process of extracting truths from nature, much like a miner extracts valuable ore from the earth. But this model no longer suffices in light of what we now understand about information ensembles.

When we acknowledge that information entities are always constituted within ensembles, we are forced to confront the fact that scientific knowledge is inherently relational. These ensembles are not passive background conditions; they are active frameworks that shape the interaction between observer and observed. They establish the rules for measurement, define the boundaries of relevance, and determine the very structure of inquiry.

In essence, they instantiate a form of proto-sociality—a basic form of collective engagement where meaning is generated not in isolation, but in relation to a framework that governs interaction. Just as social reality is constructed through relationships and shared norms, scientific reality is constructed through engagement with information ensembles that mediate between the observer and the world.

Proto-Sociality in Scientific Practice

What do we mean by proto-sociality in this context? In social life, individuals act within systems of shared meaning—languages, customs, norms, and rules—that allow communication and coordinated action. Without these systems, interaction would be chaotic, and mutual understanding impossible.

In science, information ensembles function similarly. They establish a common interpretive structure that scientists rely on to coordinate their observations and findings. A few examples:

The Death of the Lone Observer

The invocation of proto-sociality in science marks the death of the lone observer model. No scientist, no matter how brilliant or insightful, operates in isolation from these interpretive frameworks. The idea that one could directly access the truth of nature without the mediation of a framework now seems untenable.

Instead, science can be seen as a fundamentally collective practice, one that is social not merely in the sense that scientists work in teams or share papers, but in a deeper, more structural sense: science requires participation in shared information ensembles. Just as social reality is sustained by shared norms and values, scientific reality is sustained by shared interpretive frameworks that define the boundaries of what is knowable.

This proto-sociality is what makes science possible. It provides the scaffolding within which individual observations gain meaning and become communicable. Without these frameworks, scientific facts would be nothing more than idiosyncratic data points, disconnected from any larger understanding.

Moving Beyond the Myth of Objectivity

Recognizing proto-sociality within scientific inquiry does not undermine objectivity; it redefines it. Objectivity is no longer about standing outside of the system, viewing it from an impossible God's-eye perspective. Instead, objectivity becomes about participation in a well-structured ensemble, where the rules of engagement are clear, shared, and transparent.

Rather than pretending that our interpretive frameworks are incidental to the reality we uncover, we can embrace them as integral to the process of inquiry. This doesn't mean all frameworks are equal; some are better suited for certain tasks, and their effectiveness can be tested, refined, or replaced as needed. But it does mean that all knowledge is relational—born out of a dialogue between observer and the world, mediated by an ensemble of shared interpretive structures.

Proto-Sociality as a New Foundation for Science

This shift from God's sensorium to proto-sociality represents a new foundation for how we think about science. No longer can we see scientific inquiry as a process of extraction, where information is mined from nature and cataloged as objective fact. Instead, we must see it as a participatory process in which knowledge is forged through interaction within an ensemble.

This shift invites us to be more mindful of the frameworks we use and the assumptions we carry into our inquiries. It also opens the door to a more pluralistic understanding of science, one that recognizes the value of multiple interpretive frameworks and the potential for different ensembles to yield different, yet complementary, insights about the world.

In short, by embracing the proto-sociality inherent in scientific practice, we can move beyond the myth of detached objectivity and toward a richer, more nuanced understanding of the nature of knowledge itself.